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Abstract
According to the simple modal account of essence, an object has a property essentially just
in case it has it in every world in which it exists. As many have observed, the simple modal
account is implausible for a number of reasons. This has led to various proposals for strength-
ening the account, for example, by adding a restriction to the intrinsic or sparse properties. I
argue, however, that these amendments to the simple modal account themselves fail. Drawing
on lessons from these failures, I propose a new version of a modal account, inspired by Ruth
Barcan Marcus’s defense of the coherence of quantified modal logic, according to which an ob-
ject has a property essentially just in case (i) it has it in every world in which it exists, (ii) the
property is discriminating (or non-trivial), and (iii) the property is qualitative. The resulting ac-
count of essence does not face any of the standard objections other accounts face, and I defend
it from other potential objections.
1 Essence and counterfactual dependence
The distinction between essential and accidental properties was important for Aristotle in account-
ing for persistence, that is, how a thing can exist from one time to another while undergoing
change. Changes in a thing that cause a passing-away, the “substantial” changes, involve the loss
of properties essential to their bearers, while the others, the accidental changes (or “alterations”),
tell us nothing concerning what it is to be that thing. More commonly nowadays, essential proper-
ties are appealed to in determining, not only when a thing ceases to exist from one time to another,
but also when it ceases to exist from one world to another, a matter of central importance to the
philosophy of modality.1
Baruch Brody (Brody, 1973) formulates the Aristotelian Account of Essence as follows:
AAE: An object o has a property φ essentially iff o has φ and would go out of existence if it lost it.2
We might also call this the simple counterfactual account of essence. The account is intuitive and, I
believe, faithful to Aristotle, but it fails in its necessity direction. For suppose that I would have
died as a child were it not for the antibiotics that I took. Then even though the right side of AAE
is satisfied, surely it is not essential to me that I take antibiotics as a child—it is possible that I live
∗I would like to thank Julia Langkau and Nathan Wildman for very helpful feedback on an earlier version of the
paper.
1Essences have been important also for accounts that forgo possible worlds. For instance, Kit Fine argues that modal-
ity is reducible to essence; see e.g. (Fine, 1994).
2Brody develops a separate account of essence, which he also dubs ‘Aristotelian’, in (Brody, 1980). I will not discuss
that account here.
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a long life without taking any medicine whatsoever as a child. Perhaps it is essential to having
lived the life I actually lived that I took antibiotics as a child, but having lived that life is no more
essential to me than having taken antibiotics.
If a counterfactual account is to work, then, it needs to be strengthened. One way of doing so is
defended by Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (Brogaard and Salerno, 2013) in their Counterfactual
Account of Essence:
CAE: An object o has φ essentially iff (1) if there were no φs then o wouldn’t exist, and (2) it is
metaphysically necessarily that if o exists then o is φ.3
Thus, even if the first condition is satisfied in the antibiotics case, the second condition is not, and
so it is not essential to me, according to CAE, that I took antibiotics as a child. While CAE is an
improvement over AAE, it faces three important difficulties.
1. Like any counterfactual analysis, CAE must deal with the problem of counterpossibles,
that is, counterfactual conditionals (‘counterfactuals’ for short) with impossible antecedents. On
what is probably the most widely accepted semantics for counterfactuals, viz. the Lewis-Stalnaker
account, every counterpossible is vacuously true.4 In particular, if nothing had the property of
being such that two and two are four, anything goes, including the fact that I would not exist,
and so it would turn out essential to me, according to CAE, that I am essentially such that two
and two are four. But intuitively I am not essentially such that two and two are four. What B&S
say in response to this problem is that counterpossibles need not be vacuously true, and that, in
particular, it is false that if two and two weren’t four, I wouldn’t exist. Even accepting this much,
it does not help with other counterexamples, such as being such that two and two are four and I
don’t exist which, according to CAE, I have essentially. So B&S’s version of CAE depends on a
less attractive, non-standard account of counterfactuals that is, in any case, insufficient to ward off
intuitive counterexamples.5
2. Even if we accept B&S’s story about the semantics of counterpossibles, it still fails in its
sufficiency direction. Consider the following example made popular by Fine but antedated by
Michael Dunn.6 Suppose a set exists iff its members do. Then, necessarily, if Socrates exists, so
does {Socrates} of which Socrates is a member, whence condition (2) is satisfied. However, it is
also true that if nothing were a member of the singleton, that would be because Socrates doesn’t
exist—otherwise he would be a member of the singleton. Thus, if nothing were a member of the
singleton, Socrates wouldn’t exist, whence condition (1) is also satisfied. But, goes the intuition,
Socrates is not essentially a member of the singleton, and thus CAE fails.
B&S suggest the following way out:
The properties: being a member of the set {Tabby}, being such that seven is prime,
and being such that it’s either raining or not seem irrelevant to the question of what it
is to be Tabby [. . . ] Here is an explanation of said intuitions: if there hadn’t been sets
3They give two accounts, one that corresponds to the “ordinary use” of ‘essence’, which forgoes condition (2) of
CAE and is equivalent to AAE, and the other, i.e. CAE, which corresponds to the “philosophical use” of ‘essence’. My
interest here is in their philosophical use of ‘essence’.
4According to the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics, a counterfactual conditional ‘If A were the case, B would be the case’
is true iff in the “most similar” worlds where A is true, B is also true.
5See (Brogaard and Salerno, 2013) for the details. Their account also depends on a non-standard notion of the a priori
according to which neither mathematical nor logical truths are a priori. I think it would be better to restrict the φ in CAE
to contingent properties or else to rely simply on an intuitive understanding of counterfactuals rather than attempting
to provide a more rigorous analysis in terms of impossible worlds and a relation of comparative similarity amongst
them. Cases in which it is intuitively unclear what the truth-value of a counterpossible is (that is supposed to serve as a
counterexample to CAE) could be dismissed as providing weak evidence against the view.
6See (Fine, 1994) and (Dunn, 1990b, §4).
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(or if seven hadn’t been prime,. . . ), then Tabby might still have existed. (Brogaard and
Salerno, 2013, p.646)
However, the counterfactual ‘If nothing were a member of {Tabby}. . . ’ is not, as they suggest, a
counterpossible, and the evaluation of its truth does not, as they suggest, depend on what goes
on at worlds where there are no sets. Rather, it only depends on what goes on at worlds where
nothing is a member of {Tabby}, and there are plenty of such worlds that are possible, at least
on a common assumption (especially in this literature) according to which sets have contingent
existence. The closest worlds in which there are no members of the singleton are possible worlds in
which Tabby, and hence the singleton, doesn’t exist—they are not impossible worlds in which no
sets exist. CAE is therefore committed to the intuitive falsehood that Tabby is essentially a member
of {Tabby}.7
Here is a separate worry. Suppose we want to say that the natural number two is essentially
the (immediate) successor of one, or that it essentially has a certain position in the natural number
sequence. Yet, if two were not the successor of one, that might be because two exists and one
doesn’t (at least this seems compatible with what B&S say about impossible worlds). But then CAE
is committed to the intuitive falsehood that two is not essentially the successor of one. Similarly,
perhaps it is essential to two that it have infinitely many successors. Yet, if it didn’t, it might still
exist because e.g. finitism is true. While one can deny these intuitions about the essence of two,
there is a more general worry. If there is some extrinsic property that an object x essentially has in
virtue of standing in some relation R to some other object y, CAE will wrongly deem it inessential
to x that it have that property because, given their account of counterpossibles, its existence will
not counterfactually depend in the required way on the existence of y.
3. According to CAE Socrates essentially exists, for, (i) if nothing had the property of existing,
Socrates wouldn’t either, and (ii) necessarily, if Socrates exists then he exists. But, as Kit Fine has
claimed, “we do not want to say that he essentially exists” (Fine, 1994, p. 6). Fine raises this
objection, among many others, to what I shall call the Simple Modal Account:
SMA: An object o has φ essentially iff, necessarily, if o exists then o has φ.
CAE inherits the existence counterexample from SMA since the counterfactual condition cannot
help here. CAE also inherits the identity problem. It is not essential to Phosphorus that it be Hes-
perus, assuming identity properties are inessential, and yet CAE deems it so; for if nothing were
identical to Hesperus, Phosphorus wouldn’t exist. Even worse, consider an arbitrary object o. If
nothing were self-identical, would o fail to exist? I would say so, because if nothing were self-
identical, nothing at all would exist. (This might constitute an impossible but legitimate situation
according to B&S.) But then CAE also wrongly implies that the property of being self-identical is
had essentially by everything, a property that tells us absolutely nothing about any object what-
ever.8
4. According to CAE and contrary to intuition, it is essential to any distinct things that one is
distinct from the other. For instance, if nothing were distinct from the Eiffel Tower, then only it or
nothing would exist, and hence I wouldn’t. Moreover, it is necessary that if I exist, I am distinct
from the Eiffel Tower. According to CAE then, I am essentially distinct from the Eiffel Tower. These
distinctness properties will play a central role in evaluating the various accounts of essence to be
discussed below.
7The same point is made in (Steward, 2015).
8Some, e.g. (Fine, 1995), are careful to distinguish constitutive from consequential essences, where being self-identical
may be seen as a consequential but non-constitutive essence of everything. However, B&S’s discussion does not sug-
gest that they are thinking of essences as consequential. Further objections to CAE can be found in (Torza, 2015) and
(Steward, 2015).
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It is objections like these that have led Fine to deny the simple modal account, calling it “fun-
damentally misguided”. This has, in turn, motivated a number of attempts to rescue some form
of a modal account of essence by adding further conditions to SMA. CAE is one such example,
but there are a number of others. Before proposing my own account of essence, I want to look at
three additional proposals for reviving a modal account and argue that they too fail. I will use the
lessons drawn from these three accounts as a guide to formulating my own.
Since part of my aim is to provide an overview of what I take to be the most promising modal
accounts of essence, I have raised potential objections to some of these accounts that I myself do
not find worrisome. Indeed, in §5, I defend my own account from precisely these objections. And
while my arguments could also be used to defend other accounts, in §6, I argue why one should
nonetheless prefer the qualitative account of essence that I defend.
2 Intrinsicality-based accounts
One attempt to save a modal account of essence restricts SMA to intrinsic properties, giving us the
Intrinsicality-based Account of Essence:
IAE: An object o has φ essentially iff (1) necessarily, if o exists then o has φ, and (2) o has φ intrin-
sically.
A version of IAE is defended by David Denby who claims that by “excluding extrinsic properties,
[IAE] disqualifies properties that involve things other than their instances from being essential
[. . . ] [i]t thereby avoids Fine-style counterexamples, all of which do drag in other things” (Denby,
2014, p. 92).9 In Fine’s influential paper, he raises the following counterexamples to SMA:
1. being a member of {Socrates};
2. being distinct from the Eiffel Tower;
3. being such that there are infinitely many primes;
4. existence.
Among these we can include the following additional example:
5. being identical to o, for a given object o.
Now there is one example of Fine’s that does not “drag in other things”, viz., existence. If
existence is intrinsic, as it is on many accounts (e.g. it is a property the having of which cannot
differ among duplicates—see (Lewis, 1986, pp. 61-62)), then IAE incorrectly deems it an essential
property, just as SMA does. Denby says that a “useful test is that an intrinsic property cannot
vary among duplicates” and cites Lewis (1986). This is problematic, however, because properties
like being such that two and two are four never differs among duplicates, in which case they are
intrinsically, necessarily, and hence (according to IAE) essentially had by all. Rae Langton and
David Lewis claim that it is an acceptable consequence of their duplication account that all nec-
essary properties turn out intrinsic.10 Even if that were true, it would hardly be an acceptable
9Denby’s version varies from IAE only in taking intrinsicality in the second condition to be global, i.e. φ must be
intrinsic simpliciter, not just intrinsicality had by o. See also (Correia, 2007) for a different intrinsicality-based account.
Jonathan Livingstone-Banks proposes an account of constitutive essences, as opposed to consequential ones, according
to which they are necessary and intrinsic, and so runs into the same problems as discussed here concerning IAE. See
(Livingstone-Banks, 2017).
10See (Langton and Lewis, 1998, p.340).
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consequence of an account of essence that every necessary property is essentially had by all. A
defender of IAE could simply disagree with Langton and Lewis and restrict the duplication ac-
count to contingent properties, but one should then keep in mind that this restriction carries over
to their account of essence. One should also not that the duplication account needs to be restricted
to qualitative properties, so defenders of IAE who believe in non-qualitative essences will need to
choose a different account of the intrinsic.11
A related problem concerns identity properties. Denby says in the onset of his paper that
“[b]eing Socrates is a property that Socrates must have if he is to be the object he is, but in some
ways it doesn’t seem to be a very good candidate for being an essential property either”. But
if identity properties are intrinsic, as they are on many accounts, then IAE wrongly deems them
essential to their bearers. While identity properties are extrinsic according to the duplication ac-
count, given the discussion above, it is unclear whether a defender of IAE can help herself to such
an account. Depending on what a defender of IAE takes to be the intuitive facts about essentiality
they hope to preserve, it is unclear that there is any account of intrinsicality that will give them
exactly what they need.
There are two main reasons to think that IAE fails in its necessity direction, one involving
kinds and the other origins. It has been argued, for instance, that biological kinds are extrinsic, yet
most essentialists take them to be essentially had by their bearers.12 More generally, it is plausible
that most sortal kinds are extrinsically had. One widely accepted solution to the problem of the
many—i.e. the problem that there are is a large number of tables in front of me, e.g. my table
minus a splinter, my table minus an leg, etc.—is to say that the property of being a table, though
intuitively intrinsic, is extrinsic. It is extrinsic because “only the outernost, the sum of this nest of
physical objects, counts as a table” (Quine, 1981, p. 93). In other words, being a chair, along with
kind properties more generally, are extrinsic; in order to determine whether something is a chair we
must look beyond the thing in question.13 Since most believe kinds are essential to their bearers,
this is perhaps the most devastating objection to IAE.
Properties of origin are largely extrinsic. If it is essential to Socrates that he originate from
a certain zygote, then we have a counterexample to IAE. It is unclear whether Denby would be
worried by this sort of objection, however, because he nowhere mentions origin essentialism, and
he may happy to simply deny the doctrine. I raise it only to flag a potential cost for the view, since
any defender of IAE will have to reject origin essentialism.
Another worry has been alluded to above involving abstract objects such as the natural num-
bers. If it is essential to the number two that it be the (immediate) successor of one, then we have
yet another counterexample to IAE. The problem concerns anything that is at least partly extrinsi-
cally characterized.14
Michael Dunn also develops a intrinsicality-based account of essence in terms of relevant im-
11Suppose distinct objects a and b are duplicates. Since the property of being a duplicate of a does not differ among
duplicates, it would turn out intrinsic. Thus a restriction to purely qualitative properties is needed.
12For discussion, see (Dumsday, 2012).
13See (Sider, 2001) for discussion.
14Denby argues against a version of the singleton objection that assumes that having Socrates as member is extrinsic
(hence inessential according to IAE) by denying that sets have their members essentially. He could, instead, argue that
the property is intrinsic, hence essential. An Armstrongian about sets, e.g., can hold that that having Socrates as member
is intrinsic to the singleton since a set is a state of affairs that has Socrates as a non-mereological part. According to Lewis,
the property would be extrinsic since the singleton is mereologically simple, but Lewis’s views here are problematic for
a number of reasons. See (Caplan et al., 2010) for an account according to which singletons have their members as
mereological parts, in which case having Socrates as member would be intrinsic to the singleton (but perhaps not for
other sets containing Socrates as member). For details concerning Armstrong and Lewis’s views about the mereological
relationship between sets and their members, see (Armstrong, 1991) and (Lewis, 1991).
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plication:
RAE: An object o has φ essentially iff ∀x(x = o → φ(x)),
where→ is relevant implication (e.g. of the logic R).15 RAE is a version of an intrinsicality-based
account because Dunn reads ‘o has φ intrinsically’ as ∀x(x = o → φ(x)), and so RAE is just a
formal rendering of IAE based on relevant logic.
From what Dunn says, one would naturally conclude that RAE gracefully deals with all of the
standard objections:
Tom could cease to be a member of the set Tom, Dick by virtue of Dick’s non-existence,
for then, on at least a standard intuition, the set would no longer exist. But this certainly
produces a big change in the set. The only other way that the membership “relation”
could fail to hold is for Tom not to exist, and this too would produce a change in the set.
To recapitulate, if the membership “relation” were to fail to hold, this would require a
change in the set, but it need not require a change in the member (in this case Tom).
Thus membership determines relevant properties in only its second position. (Dunn,
1990a, p. 90)
But here Fine is right: “there is nothing in the “logic” of the situation to justify an asymmetric
judgement of relevance; the difference lies entirely in the nature of the objects in question” (Fine,
1994, p. 7). Clearly the logic of the conditional cannot tell us that “membership determines relevant
properties in only its second position”, and so this must be presupposed. RAE therefore fails to
deal with the example involving being a member of {Socrates}without presupposing what is already
at issue.
Like IAE, RAE also faces the objections from existence and identity. If we let φ be the property
of existing, then the right side of RAE comes out true for any choice of object, and so it deems
it essential to anything whatsoever that it exists. This is a consequence of the relevance-based
account of intrinsicality according to which existence is intrinsic. Similarly, identity properties
turn out essential, since it is a (relevant) logical truth that if anything is identical to o, then that
thing is identical to o. Moreover, since the account of intrinsicality is spelled out rigorously, we
cannot get around these problems by proposing an account of intrinsicality according to which
existence or identity properties are extrinsic, which is at least an option that is open to defenders
of less rigid versions of IAE.
These worries concerning (i) existence, (ii) identity, (iii) maximal properties such as kinds, (iv)
intrinsic relations and, for some, (v) origin essentialism, raise serious doubts about the tenability
of any intrinsicality-based account of essence.
3 Sparsity-based accounts
To keep matters simple, let us say that an arbitrary class of possibilia determines (or is) a prop-
erty. For instance, {Socrates, The Eiffel Tower} determines the property of being identical to either
Socrates or The Eiffel Tower. Clearly no such property plays a role in making for genuine similar-
ity, but they are nonetheless legitimate, instantiated properties. Call a sparse property a property
15See (Dunn, 1990b) and (Dunn, 1990a) for details. One can also formulate a relevance-based account where  has
narrow scope, or by eliminating the necessity operator altogether and using a modally loaded conditional such as that
of the logic E, which is different from a strict R-conditional. One could also go with a disjunctive account based on these
variations, so there are quite a few versions of the relevance-based account.
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that “carves nature at its joints”.16 Call a property abundant if it is not sparse. Given the objections
we have so far seen to modal accounts of essence that seem to involve abundant properties, a nat-
ural thought would be to restrict SMA to sparse properties, yielding the Sparsity-based Account
of Essence:
SAE: An object o has φ essentially iff (1) necessarily, if o exists then o has φ, and (2) φ is sparse.
Nathan Wildman gives an independent motivation for SAE (which he calls SPM) as follows:
Suppose that an abundant property P is metaphysically significant to an actually ex-
isting object o, such that P plays a part in determining what o is. Because P is meta-
physically significant to o, any attempt to characterise the actual world without citing
P would not fully determine what o is and would therefore be incomplete. As such,
P is required to characterise things completely and without redundancy. And, since
the sparse properties are those properties which characterise things completely and
without redundancy, P must then be sparse. This, however, contradicts the initial as-
sumption regarding P’s abundance. So either P is not metaphysically significant or P
is a sparse property, which is logically equivalent to the claim that being sparse is a
necessary condition for being metaphysically significant. (Wildman, 2013, p. 764)
If part of what it is to be an object consists in having certain non-qualitative properties, then a
property’s being metaphysically significant cannot entail its being sparse or even being definable
from sparse properties because such properties are typically taken to be qualitative. So the argu-
ment succeeds only if all properties that are metaphysically significant are qualitative.17 I myself
am partial to such a qualitative view about essences, but I suppose many others will not be, at least
not without argument.18
On the other hand, if part of what it is to be an object includes only qualitative properties, then I
do not see why some of those properties couldn’t fail to be sparse. For instance, most would agree
that the qualitative property of being a house is part of what it is to be a certain object, say the
White House, and yet being a house is not a sparse property on even the most liberal understanding
of sparsity.19 It would be a significant bullet to bite to deny that abundant kind properties, such
as being a house or being a painting, are essential to their bearers. Thus, one of the most significant
drawbacks of the sparsity-based account is that it is too restrictive in excluding plausible non-
sparse essences.20
Coming back to the problem of origin essentialism and SAE, and in order to deal with relational
essential properties more generally, Wildman suggests disjoining the following to SAE:
SRM: Object o essentially bears relation φ to o′ iff (i) necessarily, if o exists, then φ holds of the
ordered pair 〈o, o′〉 and (ii) φ is a sparse relation.
16It does not matter whether we assume that sparse properties are instantiated.
17Alternatively, one could hold that the non-qualitative properties somehow supervene on the qualitative or that
some sparse properties are non-qualitative, but these claim are contentious and largely disputed.
18I defend a qualitative account of essences below.
19I will say a bit more in §5 about the distinction between the qualitative and non-qualitative. Concerning sparseness,
defenders of SAE endorse a liberal conception of sparseness according to which “the sparse properties are those prop-
erties invoked in the total scientific understanding of the world, regardless of level of occurrence” (Wildman, 2013, p.
766). On this scientific conception of sparseness, see (Schaffer, 2004). Sam Cowling (Cowling, 2012) defends an analo-
gous sparse account of natures, but he thinks that natures are distinct from essences and so he is happy to endorse SMA
for essences.
20See (Skiles, 2017) for similar and additional objections to a sparsity-based account.
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However, I do not see how this is supposed to help with OE unless it is assumed the property orig-
inates from is sparse, an assumption that looks to me highly contentious. Concerning OE, Wildman
says the following:
SRM accounts for asymmetries in the essentiality of a relation via modal variation: as-
suming origin essentialism, it is essential to Socrates that he originates from gametes g,
but not essential to g that Socrates originates from them. According to SRM, the former
is true because, in every world where Socrates exists, the originates from relation holds
of 〈Socrates, gametes〉. (Wildman, 2013, p. 773)
But whether SRM helps to account for asymmetries is beside the point. We cannot forget about
condition (ii) of SRM which requires that the relation originates from be sparse. However, it is
scarcely obvious that the origination relation is sparse and if it isn’t, the sparsity-based account is
incompatible with OE.21 At any rate, while the defender of SAE is free to reject OE, the point is
that they cannot accept OE and get around the problem of origins by an appeal to SRM.
Another problem with SRM is that if membership is sparse, as many think it is, then SRM
wrongly yields that it is essential to Socrates that he be a member of {Socrates}. Moreover, if
membership is sparse then its converse isn’t, and so {Socrates} won’t have essentially Socrates as
member.22 Wildman simply bites the bullet here and maintains that it is essential to Socrates that
he be a member of the singleton. I find it more plausible to deny such counterexamples on grounds
independent of essence, a topic we will come to shortly.23
Alternatively, a defender of SRM could deny the sparsity of membership. But this would be
of little help since we can construct a similar objection in terms of parthood which most consider
sparse.24 If a set literally has its members as part, then Socrates necessarily stands in the parthood
relation to {Socrates}, and so he will essentially stand in that relation according to SRM.25 But as
many have agreed, it is not essential to Socrates that he be a member of any set. This example
suggests the following more general worry involving parthood. Assuming mereological essential-
ism, it follows from SRM that a part is essentially a part of any whole it composes, if that whole
exists whenever the part does (which is not generally the case). For example, assuming a necessary
connection between an object o and its singleton, let o + {o} be the sum composed of precisely o
and its singleton. Then necessarily, if o exists, it is part of o + {o}. Assuming parthood is sparse,
SRM wrongly yields that o is essentially part of o + {o}. Clearly this argument applies any time
there is a necessary connection between distinct objects. For instance, if 2 necessarily exists, then o
is essentially part of o + 2 for any o, which is certainly counterintuitive.
21Wildmam has suggested to me in personal communication that the origination relation will need to be sparse in
order to characterize things completely. I would be surprised if this were the case since an object’s originating e.g. from
some particular matter can be described in terms of properties more fundamental than the origination relation. For
instance, if I carve a doorknob out of a hunk of wood, then specifying that the doorknob originates from the wood can
be given in terms of a specification of the causal relations and processes leading from my act of carving the knob out of
the wood. At any rate, the burden of proof seems to me to lie on the SAE defender to show that originates from is sparse.
22The converse of a relation R is easily definable from R, so if a sparse relation is one that characterizes things without
redundancy, then only one of R and its converse can be sparse, assuming them to be distinct.
23A referee offers the following response on behalf of the sparsity-based account: instead of membership, take the
converse of membership to be sparse. This gets around both problems, viz. (i) Socrates being essentially a member of
his singleton and (ii) the singleton not essentially having Socrates as member. The only issue I have with this clever
response is that I find it somewhat implausible that an account of essence should favor one among many prima facie
equally good set-theoretic primitives. Nonetheless, I think this response is favorable to biting the bullet.
24Lewis suggests that membership, parthood and identity are perfectly natural; see (Lewis, 1986, p. 67, fn. 47).
25This view is not widely held. David Armstrong held that sets have their members as non-mereological parts since
sets are states of affairs; see (Armstrong, 1991). However, see (Caplan et al., 2010) for a view according to which single-
tons have their members as mereological parts.
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A final worry concerns identity. If identity is sparse, then SRM wrongly implies that the prop-
erty of being self-identical—a property trivially had by everything—is essential. The defender of
the sparsity-based account has two options. First, she could deny that self-identity is sparse be-
cause e.g. it is definable via Leibniz’s law in second-order logic. Second, she could accept that
being self-identical is essential despite the fact that it plays no role in telling us what an object is.
The second option seems to me to be a non-starter given the motivation of the sparsity-based ac-
count, according to which essential properties have the role of telling us what it is to be a given
object. And the first option is problematic because even if being self-identical is logically definable,
that does not make it less sparse than e.g. the property of being a human, a property which is
also definable in terms of more fundamental resources but is nonetheless sparse according to the
scientific conception employed by defenders of a sparsity-based account.
4 Discriminating-based accounts
In the debate between Quine and those who defended the coherence of quantification into modal
contexts (what Quine called the third grade of modal involvement), Ruth Barcan Marcus responded
to Quine by arguing that quantified modal logic (QML) is not committed to essentialism at all. In
particular, QML is in no way committed to things having properties such as being essentially two-
legged that figured prominently in Quine’s arguments against QML’s alleged commitment to Aris-
totelian essences.26 A reconstruction of Barcan Marcus’s defense of QML against Quinean charge
of essentialism goes as follows. First, let us call (weak) essentialism the thesis that something bears
a property necessarily that something else possibly lacks.27 Now suppose there are at least two
individuals o and o′. Then o has the property of being identical to o which o′ lacks, and thus weak
essentialism follows. However, while an identity property such as being identical to o is essentially
had by o, the property of being self-identical is not, since it is non-discriminating (or “trivial” as
Barcan Marcus puts it), i.e. it provably holds of everything. Now by the law of abstraction, we
have that
Abstraction: 〈λy.φ〉(o) ⇐⇒ 〈λy.φ(o/y)〉(o),
where φ(o/y) results by replacing every free occurrence of o in φ by y.28 That is, any predication
“referential with respect to o” (i.e. one that involves a predicate abstract with an occurrence of o)
is equivalent to one that is non-referential with respect to o. In particular,
〈λy.y = o〉(o) ⇐⇒ 〈λy.y = y〉(o);
that is, o’s having the property of being necessarily identical to o is logically equivalent to o’s being
necessarily self-identical, which is non-discriminating. Barcan Marcus then says:
This suggests that there is an additional sense in which provably essential attributes
are trivial in QM. For any proof which is carried out with referential attributes may be
paralleled by an equivalent proof with non-referential attributes [. . . ] The question re-
mains whether attributes of the sort which Quine discusses, e.g., two-leggedness, could
26See (Quine, 1966).
27See (Barcan Marcus, 1967). While Barcan Marcus assumes that the domain of each world is constant, we could allow
a variable domain and rework the definition to add an existence condition, but to keep matters simple let us assume a
constant domain. Fine discusses these two types of modal definitions of essence, calling one categorical and the other
conditional.
28This assumes that all singular terms are rigid designators.
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be among the provably essential attributes of QM. Clearly they cannot be, for if [‘o is
necessarily two-legged] were categorically true in QM, and since [being two-legged] is a
non-referential attribute, any proof of [o’s being necessarily two-legged] could be car-
ried out for any object whatever. But the implicit assumption of traditional essentialism
is that such attributes are necessary to some objects but not to all. (Barcan Marcus, 1967,
p. 96).
The last sentence is a demand for a discrimination constraint on essences: a property φ is es-
sentially had by something only if it is not essentially had by everything—it must discriminate
between objects. More precisely, we can say that an object has a property non-discriminatingly if the
object’s having the property is, given Abstraction, logically equivalent to its having a property that
is necessarily had by all. For instance, the property of being identical to o is non-discriminatingly
had by o because o’s having the property is, given Abstraction, equivalent to its having the prop-
erty of being self-identical, which is necessarily had by all. (Properties necessarily had by all are
therefore had non-discriminatingly by any object whatsoever.) Thus according to Barcan Mar-
cus’s view, being idenical to o is inessential to o. These considerations lead us to the following
Discrimination-based Account of essence:
DAE: An object o has φ essentially iff (1) necessarily, if o exists then o has φ, and (2) o has φ
discriminatingly, i.e. it is not the case that, necessarily, everything has φ, and o’s having φ is
not equivalent to o’s having a property that is necessarily had by all.
This account is defended by Michael Della Rocca who formulates the discrimination condition as
follows:
There are two kinds of trivial necessary properties. The first kind consists of properties
that are necessary not only to A but also to each thing. Examples are: being male if a
bachelor and being self-identical. However, a property’s being universally necessary
is not required for its being trivial. Consider a property F which A has necesssarily
but which is not universally necessary. A’s possession of F fails to be grounded in A’s
specific nature if A’s possession of F logically follows from A’s possession of G, where
G is universally necessary. (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 3)
Unfortunately, there is an infelicity in the way Della Rocca states the discriminating or non-
triviality constraint that has caused some to object. In particular, Wildman argues that it leads to
the consequence that no property is essential.29 Consider being human which, we assume, is had
essentially by Socrates. His having the property logically follows from his having the property
of being human if Socrates, that is, that Socrates is human is a logical consequence of the fact that
Socrates is human if Socrates (and the logical truth that everything is self-identical). But since
everything has the property of being human if Socrates, Socrates would not be essentially human,
and since the argument generalizes, no property would be essential to anything. However, given
the fact that Della Rocca references Barcan Marcus’s work and uses the same example involving
identity propreties when stating the discriminating constraint, it is plausible that his own view is
best captured by DAE. At any rate, Wildman’s discussion is instructive by illustrating one way to
not formulate the discrimination constraint.
DAE is, however, left unscathed by Wildman’s objection, for being human is not an instance of
a property that is necessarily had by all. Indeed, DAE does quite well in managing to skirt nearly
all of the standard objections to the standard modal account. For instance, in addition to avoiding
29See (Wildman, 0126). Livingstone-Banks agrees; see (Livingstone-Banks, 2017, fn. 4; p. 828).
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the objection from identity properties, it avoids the objections involving existence, being such that
there are infinitely many primes, and being part of the sum of Socrates and the number two, a property
that caused trouble for SAE. Moreover, according to DAE, it is essential to {Socrates} that it have
Socrates as member.
Why think that essences need be discriminating? Barcan has already hinted at one. If a property
is trivial then it fails to tell us what it is to be a particular object over any other object, and so such
properties do not play one of the primary roles associates with (constitutive) essences. In other
words, the discrimination constraint ensures that essences really do shed light on the true natures
of things. Fine also considers the constraint as a way to avoid potential counterexamples, but
dismisses it immediately:
To get round the second difficulty [to the standard modal account according to which
everything is essentially such that φ, for φ a necessary truth], one might make the ad-
ditional demand on an essential property that it not be an essential property, in the
original sense, of every object whatever. The counterexamples which were constructed
from necessary truths would then be overturned. But these examples could be readily
reinstated by conjoining the given degenerate essential property with one which was
not degenerate. (Fine, 1994, p. 7)
Adding the discrimination constraint to the standard modal account (SMA), I am not essentially
self-identical, since everything would be essentially so, but I am nonetheless essentially self-identical
and human, since if I exist I have the property and the property is discriminating. But I find it cu-
rious that Fine simply assumes this to be problematic. The property being self-identical and human
is necessarily coextensive with being human, which on many accounts makes the properties identi-
cal, and there is nothing wrong with my being essentially human, hence nothing wrong with my
being essentially self-identical and human. It is only problematic on a hyperintensional account of
properties that distinguishes the two, and even still it is not obvious that such properties should
be inessential.30
There are only two standard objections that DAE cannot deal with. First, while it correctly
deems it essential to {Socrates} that it have Socrates as member, it also deems it essential to
Socrates that he be a member of the singleton, so it cannot account for the asymmetry between
these two cases.31 Second, DAE wrongly deems being distinct from the Eiffel Tower essential to
Socrates, since the property is discriminating. Even though I am not much bothered by the set-
theoretic objection for reasons we will come to shortly, the distinctness objection is serious enough
to constitute a counterexample by my lights. So while DAE comes close to providing an adequate
account of essence, it doesn’t quite get there.
30On an account that identifies strictly equivalent properties, an account of essence need not be thought of as conse-
quential rather than constitutive. For even if o is essentially φ, it cannot be essentially φ ∨ ¬φ (where ∨ is understood as
property-forming) according to DAE, for instance.
31It is important to note that while the property being such that Socrates is a member of {Socrates} is trivial, neither being
a member of {Socrates} nor being a singleton having Socrates as member are instances of it. I mention this because Zylstra
objects to a modal account by arguing that for any such account there will be a pair of necessarily coexistent objects “that
differ with respect to what is essential to them concerning some polyadic predicate they jointly satisfy” (Zylstra, 2017,
p. 2), making such an account inadequate. To show this he implicitly appeals to Socrates and {Socrates} as a witness
pair, claiming that only the singleton has essentially being such that Socrates is a member of {Socrates}. The problem is that
both of them have this non-discriminating, Cambridge-looking property and, moreover, one has it essentially iff the other
does. The asymmetry can only be captured through the use of the two discrminating properties each of which is had by
precisely one of the pair, and this enough to undermine Zylstra’s objection. The problem appears to lie in a confusion
between the properties being a member of {Socrates} and being such that Socrates is a member of {Socrates}.
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5 A qualitativeness-based account
I think DAE is two thirds correct, and one third incomplete—essences must be necessarily had and
discriminating, but an additional constraint is missing. The two counterexamples to the account
involving singletons and distinctness properties lead, I think, to a highly plausible third condition,
but this condition is, I will argue, a very natural constraint on an account of essence, independently
of avoiding counterexamples. The condition is that an individual has a property essentially only
if the property is qualitative. This leads to the following Qualitativeness-based Account of Essence:
QAE: An object o has φ essentially iff (1) necessarily, if o exists then o has φ, and (2) o has φ
discriminatingly, i.e. it is not the case that, necessarily, everything has φ, and o’s having φ is
not equivalent to o’s having a property that is necessarily had by all, and (3) φ is qualitative.
QAE avoids all of Fine’s counterexamples plus the identity one. Socrates does not have being a
member of {Socrates} essentially since the property is non-qualitative, and likewise for being distinct
from the Eiffel Tower and being identical to Socrates. He does not have being such that there are infinitely
many primes since the property is non-discriminating, and likewise for the property of existing and
being self-identical.
What is it for a property to be non-qualitative? Roughly, it is for the property to essentially
involve or depend on a particular (e.g. time, place, or individual). For instance, the property of
being a tower is qualitative while the property of being distinct from the Eiffel Tower is not. Lewis
defines the qualitative properties as those that are definable from the sparse (what he calls the
“perfectly natural”) ones, but many other proposals have been suggested.32 For present purposes,
I will simply take the notion as intuitive.
What motivates the view that essences be qualitative? First, non-qualitative properties seem to
tell us very little if anything about the nature of things. For instance, consider identity and distinct-
ness properties, such as being identical to o and being distinct from o. The bearing of such properties
tells us nothing about the nature of the bearers partly because they make specific reference to the
entity whose nature is under discussion or else to distinct entities altogether. Second, according to
a naturalistic metaphysics that I favor, essences are scientifically “discoverable”; they are proper-
ties that are important to science that shed insight on the natures of kinds of entities. Third, there
are what I take to be convincing reasons to reject non-qualitative essences—such as haecceities—
that are posited as a means of providing sufficient conditions for transworld identity.33 There are,
however, three potentially problematic cases for a qualitative constraint on essences: (i) origin es-
sentialism (OE), (ii) mereological essentialism, and (iii) membership essentialism (as I shall call it).
I will address each of these in turn.
(i) Since this is not the place to give detailed arguments against OE, I will refer the reader to
some excellent sources.34 However, let me briefly explain what I take to be one of the main reasons
for rejecting OE. Typically, OE is leveraged as a means for answering questions of transworld
identity—that is, in telling us when two objects from different worlds are (possibly) the same.35
Now suppose an object o originates from z, e.g., suppose I originate from a certain zygote z. Then,
in order to determine whether something else in another world w is me, we need to determine
32See (Lewis, 1983) for Lewis’s account, and (Cowling, 2015) for an overview of various other ways of drawing the
qualitative and non-qualitative divide.
33The having of a property can provide a sufficient condition for being identical to o at one world but not another, e.g.,
because it is possible that two things satisfy the property. For this reason I am avoiding the term ‘individual essence’.
34See e.g. (Robertson, 1998) and (Mackie, 2006, §§3.4–3.6).
35Being the same needn’t mean being strictly identical, for two people, tables, etc. from different worlds can be the
same people, tables, etc. without sharing all their properties.
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whether that thing in w originates from z. (I am setting aside tangential worries, e.g. that two
things in w could have originated from z.) In turn, determining whether something z′ is z would
require—given the purpose of positing origins—that z also have an origin and then determining
whether z and z′ have the same origin. Eventually, determining whether something in w is me
will eventually bottom out in determining whether something in w originates from a certain hunk
of matter m. For simplicity, let us assume that this something is the zygote z itself from which I
originated. Therefore, in determining whether something is me in a world, we need to determine
whether something originates from m. The problem, which Mackie calls the recycling problem,
is that, intuitively, the zygote z need not have originated from m—z could have been synthesized
from different material to form a structurally identical zygote from which I could have originated.
Thus if OE plays a role in determining transworld identity, it needs to apply “all the way down”.
But it’s implausible that it does, since hunks of matter don’t have their origins essentially.36
Even if a defender of OE relaxes the principle of origin for certain objects, e.g. by requiring only
that z originate from matter largely overlapping z—a view known as flexible origin essentialism—
equally worrying problems arise. Through a chain of possibilities we can obtain the impossibility
that o1 could have been the same as o2 which could have been the same as. . . which could have
been the same as on, and yet o1 and on originate from matter that fail to largely overlap, implying
that they could have failed to be the same. This violates the principle that if o could have been o′
and o′ could have been o′′ then o could have been o′′, which follows from the necessity of identities.
For suppose that abc originates from a, b, and c, that cde originates from c, d, and e, and that acd
originates from a, c, and d and that for these objects originating from matter having at least two
parts in common with one’s actual origins is sufficient to originate from matter largely overlapping
one’s origins. It then follows, according to a flexible OE, that both abc and cde could have been acd,
but that neither could have been the other; whence the thesis of flexible origins is false.37
Nonetheless, I see that a rejection of OE remains a potential cost for QAE. It could be avoided
if properties of origin, such as having originated from some particular zygote, are qualitatively
specifiable, but it is highly controversial that such properties are qualitative. Nonetheless, one rea-
son in favor of defending qualitative properties of origin is that doing so allows one to avoid a
commitment to haecceitism. For if the having of only one of the properties in question in a particu-
lar world is sufficient to be me, then there is a qualitatively indiscernible world that differs in what
it represents de re concerning me, and this implies haecceitism.38 So, for those who would prefer to
avoid haecceitism, e.g. in order to maintain a supervenience thesis according to which represen-
tation de re supervenes on the qualitative, there may be reason for maintaining that properties of
origin are qualitatively specifiable.
(ii) Let us now turn to mereological essentialism. Take the sum of a and b. If it has its parts
essentially, then it has at least two non-qualitative properties essentially. So the question is whether
sums have their parts essentially. I believe they do not for the reason that (concrete) objects, such
as people and tables, just are the sums of their parts, and objects such as these could have had
different parts. Consider the table before me. It is the sum of certain parts including its legs, and
it is hardly plausible to say that its legs are essential to it. So the table, which I believe is the sum
36A referee suggests the following counterexample to QAE: it seems essential to the painting Guernica that it was
created by Picasso. However, the argument just given against OE applies equally to artefacts such as paintings. If being
created by Picasso according to a certain plan is used to uniquely pick out Guernica in worlds in which it exists, then there
must be a property that uniquely picks out Picasso in worlds in which he (or at lest Guernica) exists, contrary to the
argument just given. Moreover, I do not find it more compelling that artefacts should have non-qualitative essences
than should non-artefacts, such as people.
37Alternatively, the defender of flexible origins could deny the necessity of identities, but this would constitute a
significant cost for most defenders of OE.
38I am here following Lewis’s definition of haecceitism; see (Lewis, 1986, §4.4).
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of its parts, could have had different parts. I believe in sums because I believe in composite objects,
and I believe that a composite object is, at any given time, nothing more than the sums of its parts
at that time. Since I also believe that ordinary composite objects could have had different parts, I
believe the same of sums.39
One reason, and I think a poor one, to accept mereological essentialism derives from the view
that sums are akin to sets, which the majority believe to have their members essentially. Why
believe that sets and sums are analogous in this respect? One reason, I imagine, comes from the
view that sums (at least some of them) are individuated entirely by their parts in the same way that
sets are individuated entirely by their members. Once you’ve specified a set’s members, you’ve
specified the set, and that gives us some reason to think that sets have their members essentially.
But if ordinary things are the sums of their parts, then the analogy between sums and sets breaks
down. I am the sum of my constituents, but I am individuated neither entirely nor even partly
by my constituents. It’s possible that something have the same parts as me and yet that thing
fails to be me, even when those parts are arranged in the same way my parts are now arranged.
Moreover, even arbitrarily specified sums fail to have their parts essentially because (i) their parts
could have had different parts, as with the sum of this table and the Eiffel Tower, and (ii) parthood
is transitive (unlike membership). It would not help the mereological essentialist to say “let o be
the object having exactly the parts a and b, where a and b are simples” (further assuming that a
simple could not have had parts) with the intention of denoting an object that essentially has a and
b as parts. For there is no reason to think that we can define into existence objects having precisely
the essences we desire. The mere fact that an object is picked out entirely in terms of its parts does
not make it essential to that object that it have those parts. I conclude that there is no good reason
to think that sums and sets are analogous in the respect of having their constituents (i.e. parts or
members) essentially.
One worry for the anti-essentialist view I’ve just sketched concerns the problem of coincidence.
If composite objects are nothing more than the sums of their parts, then since a statue and the sum
of its constituents have the same parts, I am committed to their identity. Yet, intuitively, they
have different properties, e.g. one could have survived squashing and the other not, whence by
Leibniz’s law the two are distinct. What I say in this case is that whether a thing has a certain,
e.g. modal but also temporal, property depends on how the thing is picked out. This is similar to
a counterpart-theoretic solution to the problem, according to which one and the same thing may
have different properties in virtue of being picked out by names that evoke different counterpart
relations, such as one that emphasizes the statuehood of an object or one that emphasizes its being
a lump of clay. This makes it true that a statue can survive squashing as long as it is picked out
using the right sortal or expression that evokes a counterpart relation according to which the statue
has counterparts that survive squashing.40
(iii) What about sets then? Is it not essential to {Socartes}, e.g., that it have the non-qualitative
property of having Socrates as member? I am a structuralist about abstracta such as sets, and
what does not exist cannot have essential properties, so potentially problematic cases involving
non-qualitative essences of sets do not arise for me. However, since not everyone believes in struc-
turalism (or nominalism), let me briefly discuss a few additional reasons for rejecting essentialism
about membership.
We should first distinguish two separate principles. The first is a modal version of Extension-
39See (van Inwagen, 2006) for a defense of such a view.
40See (Noonan, 1991), (Fine, 1999), and (Paul, 2004) for related but importantly different views. In particular, Paul
does not maintain the identity of the statue with its constituents since they bear different representational properties
and are thus distinct objects. Similarly, for Fine the lump and the lump qua statue have different modal properties, but
they are again distinct objects.
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ality:
Extensionality: ∀z((z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y),
which says that, necessarily, any two sets with the same members are the same set. Extension-
ality provides an individuation condition for sets—it tells us exactly when two sets are identical.
Clearly, however, it is not an essentialist principle—it does not imply that sets have their members
necessarily. Indeed, no modalized version of the axioms of set theory (e.g. ZFC) entails an essen-
tialist principle, so essentialism about membership does not flow from our best theory (or theories)
of what sets are. Such an essentialist principle constitutes a further metaphysical postulate that is
up for negotiation. Whether we accept the following very distinct principle of Membership Essen-
tialism (or some analog) will depend on many things, including a consideration of the role sets are
supposed to play within various discourses:
ME: ∀x∀y(x ∈ y→ (E!y→ (E!x ∧ x ∈ y))).41
The main point is that ME does not follow from a mathematical conception of set, a conception that
gives us our best (and consistent) handle on what sets are.
What role is the notion of a set supposed to play? Some tell us that “a pack of wolves, a
bunch of grapes, or a flock of pigeons are all examples of sets of things” (Halmos, 1974, p. 1).
But packs of wolves, bunches of grapes, and the like do not have their members essentially; when
one amongst the pack dies, the whole pack does not cease to exist. Similarly, others tell us that “a
set is a collection of all elements that satisfy a certain given property” (Jech, 2006, p. 3). But the
collection of things that are red can change its members from one time to another. Thus, according
to one of the roles played by sets, sets do not have their members essentially. One may argue that
the technical notion of a set is different from the intuitive notion of a collection (which must be
the case if the latter is inconsistent) and that we therefore have little to no reason to buy into this
sort of argument against membership essentialism, but the point is simply that, while one finds no
justification for membership essentialism in the technical notion of a set, one will equally find no
justification for the doctrine in the intuitive notion either.
There are, of course, different ways to denote a set, and one way is to provide an exhaustive
list of its members, as with ‘{Obama, Lincoln}’. Every set can be denoted non-rigidly, e.g. the
previous set by ‘the set of US presidents to have served either in 1862 or 2010’. Assuming the
extensions of the expressions is identical, does that extension have its members essentially or not?
I see no compelling reason to think that it does. If there is a particular worry about not being able to
pick out “the same set” from world to world, I think that worry is easily appeased by the fact that
we can introduce a term that rigidly picks out {Obama, Lincoln}. Again, it is a further question
whether that term picks out a particular set with its own nature.
Another role sets serve is to represent (or be) properties or universals, a view known as class
nominalism. One of the main objections to this brand of nominalism is known as Wolterstorff’s
argument which runs as follows.42
1. Sets have their members essentially.43
2. Properties do not have their instances essentially.
41See (Forbes, 1983) for discussion of a related principle, viz. ∀x∀y(y ∈ x → (E!x → y ∈ x)).
42See (Wolterstorff, 1970).
43There is often a distinction made between sets and classes, where the latter may be so large that they cannot be
members of other classes, such as the class of all ordinals. Such classes are called proper. This distinction will play no
role in the discussion to follow so I will ‘set’ and ‘class’ interchangeably.
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3. Therefore, properties are not sets.
The first premise is simply assumed. If we assume the second premise and class nominalism, we
could just as well conclude that sets fail to have their members essentially.44 This is analogous to
inferring, as I did above, that things like tables are sums which fail to have their parts essentially, so
(at least some) sums fail to have their parts essentially. What can we say, then, about the problem
that being renate and being cordate are intuitively distinct and yet they have the same members,
making them the same set according to extensionality? The only available option for this strategy
is to deny that the sets are distinct, despite having the same members. This requires giving up
Extensionality as a criterion for set individuation, but that should be unsurprising for anyone
going this route. Sets will be individuated the same way properties are.45
Another way to avoid the conclusion of Wolterstorff’s argument is to maintain that there is a
sense in which properties do have their instances essentially: if properties are sets of their possible
instances, then since the possible instances of a property never change, properties have their (pos-
sible) instances essentially. This is Lewis’s way out of a variant of Wolterstorff’s argument: the
property of being renate has the same set of instances as the property of being cordate, yet the
properties are distinct. Since they have different possible instances, they are distinct on Lewis’s
view, and the objection is avoided.46 The main drawback of Lewis’s solution is that it relies on
modal realism, but I see no reason in principle why the ersatzist couldn’t pursue the same strategy
as long as they have enough ersatz possible individuals at their disposal.47
Just as the statue and its constituents are identical because they have the same parts, it can
differ with respect to its own modal and hence essential properties depending on how it is picked
out. Likewise, the set that is referred to by ‘the set consisting of all and only the creatures with a
kidney’ will have different possible instances when it is referred to by ‘the set consisting of all and
only the creatures with a heart’. So there is reason after all to hold that sets and sum are analogous
with respect to whether they have their constituents essentially.
In the end, I am not wedded to the view that certain objects, such as sets or mere sums, fail
to have their constituents essentially. Perhaps there are good reasons to hold that mere sums have
their parts essentially, or that states of affairs have their constituents essentially, or that sets have
their members essentially. If they do, then I would be fine with weakening QAE to allow that an
object o can have a non-qualitative essence but only insofar as that essence involves no more than
the constituents of o. Let me therefore propose a slight weakening of QAE that is compatible with
there being a very restricted class of non-qualitative essences:
QAE*: An object o has φ essentially iff (1) necessarily, if o exists then o has φ, and (2) φ is dis-
criminating (i.e. it is not the case that, necessarily, everything has φ and φ is not an instance
of a property that everything necessarily has), and (3) φ is qualitative unless it concerns a
constituent of o.
I do not think the qualification on the third condition is ad hoc for the reason that there arise only
very few cases, e.g. involving sets or sums, that motivate the restriction.
44Cf. (Barcan Marcus, 1974).
45This might be thought to get things backwards. The whole point of class nominalism is to identify properties
with well-behaved entities whose individuation conditions are unproblematically specified. What are the individuation
conditions of properties?
46See (Lewis, 1986, pp. 51–57).
47Cf. (Busse, 2016).
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6 Final remarks
Where does this leave us? Besides the simple modal account, we have considered six separate
modal accounts of essence. It will be helpful to diagram the views to illustrate how they compare
in terms of the main counterexamples discussed. An ‘X’ indicates that the counterexample of the
left-most column—or a closely related one—is a problem for the account, a ‘X’ indicates that it is not,
and a ‘—’ indicates that it may or may not be depending on certain background assumptions. In
other words, ‘X’s are negative for the account while checks are positive.48
CAE IAE SAE DAE QAE QAE*
x ∈ {Socrates} X X X X X X
x 6= Eiffel Tower X X X X X X
〈λx.2 + 2 = 4〉 X X X X X X
∃yy = x X X X X X X
〈λx.x = Socrates〉 X — X X X X
x is a house X X X X X X
x = x — — X X X X
Membership essentialism X X X X X X
Origin essentialism X X — X X X
First, some of the potential counterexamples may be considered weightier than others which is a
consideration the table fails to take into account. Second, some of the potential counterexamples
might cause problem for an account for the same reason, in which case the table has counted
one objection twice over. Nonetheless, I think the table strongly suggests that some version of
a qualitative account prevails. Third, while QAE* appears the most impressive, it does face the
objection that is relies on a constraint that is ad hoc. However, while I did not have space to argue
for the claim, I think it can be defended on various grounds that the restricted qualitative constraint
is well justified.
I have defended QAE in part by rejecting some popular essentialisms. What is to stop de-
fenders of other accounts from doing the same, in an effort to make their account appear more
attractive? Nothing, of course. However, even adding checks to the last two rows of IAE and SAE
would not paint them in a substantially better light compared to QAE and QAE*. For they still
face a number of compelling counterexamples that a qualitative account needn’t worry about.
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